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This paper proposes a new channel through which international trade aects macroeconomic
volatility. We study a multi-country model with heterogeneous rms that are subject to id-
iosyncratic rm-specic shocks. When the distribution of rm sizes follows a power law with
exponent suciently close to  1, the idiosyncratic shocks to large rms have an impact on
aggregate volatility. Opening to trade increases the importance of large rms to the economy,
thus raising macroeconomic volatility. We next explore the quantitative properties of the model
calibrated to data for the 50 largest economies in the world. Our simulation exercise shows
that the contribution of trade to aggregate 
uctuations depends strongly on country size: in
an economy such as the U.S., that accounts for one-third of world GDP, international trade
increases volatility by about 3.5%. By contrast, trade increases aggregate volatility by some
30% in a small open economy, such as Belgium or Poland. The model performs well in matching
the elasticity of macroeconomic volatility with respect to country size observed in cross-country
data.
JEL Classications: F12, F15, F41
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Macroeconomic volatility varies substantially across economies. Over the past 35 years, the stan-
dard deviation of per capita GDP growth is 2.5 times higher in non-OECD countries compared
to the OECD countries. Understanding the sources of these dierences is important, as aggregate
volatility itself has an impact on a wide variety of economic outcomes.1 In particular, it has been
suggested that openness to trade may contribute to macroeconomic volatility.2 Indeed, greater
volatility and increased insecurity are often invoked as a negative consequence of globalization
(Rodrik 1997, ILO 2004). As world trade experienced dramatic growth in recent decades, un-
derstanding the impact of trade openness on macroeconomic 
uctuations has become increasingly
important.
This paper proposes a new link between trade openness and macroeconomic volatility, that
focuses on the role of large exporters. Empirical evidence reveals that the distribution of rm size
is very fat-tailed { the typical economy is dominated by a few large rms (Axtell 2001). In a
recent contribution, Gabaix (2005) demonstrates that under these conditions, idiosyncratic shocks
to individual rms do not average out and can instead generate aggregate 
uctuations (see also
Delli Gatti et al., 2005). The economy is \granular," rather than smooth. Gabaix (2005) provides
both statistical and anecdotal evidence that even in the largest and most diversied economy in the
world { the United States { the biggest rms can appreciably aect macroeconomic 
uctuations.
How would international trade aect macroeconomic volatility in such economies? Seminal
contributions by Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003b) build models of
production and trade in which the unit of observation is a rm. The main prediction of these
models is that only the largest and most productive rms export. When a country opens to trade,
the largest rms become even larger, as they take advantage of export opportunities and grow to
a size not attainable in autarky. On the other hand, smaller ones shrink or disappear.
The main idea of this paper is that trade openness increases volatility by making the economy
more granular. This is the straightforward consequence of the eect described above: after trade
opening, the biggest rms become even larger relative to the size of the economy, thus contributing
more to the overall GDP 
uctuations.
Anecdotal evidence on the importance of large rms for aggregate 
uctuations abounds. Here,
we would like to describe two examples in which the role of international trade is especially evident.
In New Zealand one rm, Fonterra, is responsible for a full one-third of global dairy exports (it is the
1Numerous studies identify its eects on long-run growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995), welfare (Pallage and Robe
2003, Barlevy 2004), as well as inequality and poverty (Gavin and Hausmann 1998, Laursen and Mahajan 2005).
2A number of empirical studies show that trade openness is associated with higher volatility in a cross-section
of countries (Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz 2001, Kose, Prasad and Terrones 2003), as well as at the industry level
(di Giovanni and Levchenko 2007). Theoretical contributions include Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) and Kraay and
Ventura (2007).
1world's single largest exporter of dairy products). Such a large exporter from such a small country
would clearly matter for the macroeconomy. Indeed, Fonterra accounts for 20% of New Zealand's
overall exports, and 7% of its GDP. Two additional points about this rm are worth noting. First,
95% of Fonterra's output is exported. Thus, international trade clearly plays a prominent role in
making Fonterra as large as it is. And second, the distribution of rm size in the dairy sector is
indeed highly skewed. The second largest producer of dairy products in New Zealand is 1.3% the
size of Fonterra.3 This phenomenon is not conned to commodity exporting countries. In Korea, a
larger manufacturing-based economy, the 10 biggest business groups account for 54% of GDP and
51% of total exports. Even among the top 10, the distribution of rm size and total exports is
extremely skewed. The largest one, Samsung, is responsible for 23% of exports and 14% of GDP
(see Figure 1).4
To formally illustrate the idea that trade increases the importance of large rms in macroeco-
nomic 
uctuations, and assess its quantitative relevance, we build and calibrate a multi-country
model of trade with heterogeneous rms in the spirit of Melitz (2003). Monopolistically competi-
tive producers dier in their productivity, and face xed costs to both setting up production and
exporting. A rm decides to enter the domestic market if its variable prots cover the xed costs
of production, and it begins exporting if the variable export prots cover xed costs of accessing
a foreign market. As is the case in virtually every application of this type, only the largest/most
productive rms export. Most of the recent implementations of heterogeneous rms models assume
that the distribution of rm productivity is Pareto (see, e.g., Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004, Ghi-
roni and Melitz 2005, Chaney 2008, Arkolakis 2008, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz 2008). It turns
out that the Pareto distribution of productivity implies that distribution of rm sales follows a
power law, which is a requirement derived by Gabaix (2005) for the economy to exhibit granu-
lar features. In this sense, the link between these two literatures is even more natural than rst
expected.
We calibrate a model world economy using data for the 50 largest countries in the world. The
model matches quite well the overall and bilateral trade volumes for the countries in the sample. In
addition, it matches the elasticity of aggregate volatility with respect to country size found in the
literature (Canning, Amaral, Lee, Meyer and Stanley 1998). We show that international trade plays
a crucial role in generating this relationship: without it, the model yields a much 
atter relationship
between country size and volatility. We then use our calibrated model to perform counterfactual
3These gures are obtained from http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/rural-nz/profitability-and-
economics/contribution-of-land-based-industries-nz-economic-growth/contribution07.htm and
http://tvnz.co.nz/view/page/423466/146647.
4It turns out that the size distribution of rms is quite skewed even within business groups. For instance, breaking
Samsung down into its constituent rms reveals that the sales of Samsung Electronics alone accounted for 7% of
GDP and 15.5% of Korea's exports in 2006. We would like to thank Wonhyuk Lim of KDI for providing us with data
on Korean rm and business group sales and exports.
2exercises. The rst reveals the contribution of international trade to aggregate volatility. We
compute what aggregate volatility would be for each country in autarky, and compare it to the
volatility under the current trade regime. This exercise shows that the importance of trade for
aggregate volatility varies greatly depending on country characteristics. In the largest economies
like the U.S. or Japan, aggregate volatility is only 3.5-4% higher than it would have been in complete
autarky. In small, but remote economies such as South Africa or New Zealand, trade raises volatility
by 15% compared to autarky. Finally, in small, highly integrated economies such as Belgium or
Poland, international trade raises aggregate volatility by some 30%.
We then compute the change in aggregate volatility that would occur if trade costs decreased
below their current levels. Our simulations show that a 50% reduction in international trade costs
will lead to an average 21% increase in aggregate volatility in our set of countries, but the implied
impact varies a great deal. Small, remote countries such as New Zealand or Chile are predicted
to experience an increase in volatility of as much as 30% as a result of further trade opening. By
contrast, the largest countries such as the U.S. or Japan show the lowest increase, of as little as
9%.
The theoretical link between trade openness and volatility studied in this paper has not previ-
ously been proposed. Traditional explanations have focused on the propagation of global demand
or supply shocks (Newbery and Stiglitz 1984), or on the notion that a more open economy is
specialized in fewer sectors. Kraay and Ventura (2007) argue that developing countries are more
volatile than developed ones because their comparative advantage is in goods with more elastic
product demand and factor supply. We show that trade can increase volatility even if the nature
of shocks aecting the rms is unchanged upon opening. Our model also reveals that what matters
is not only diversication across sectors, but also across rms within the economy. Finally, our
mechanism does not rely on cross-country dierences in elasticities in goods and factor markets.
This paper is part of a small but growing literature that studies the relationship between
international trade, the production structure, and the macroeconomy. In our previous work (di
Giovanni and Levchenko 2007), we use sector-level data to demonstrate that trade openness has a
robust positive eect on sector-specic volatility, and that it results in greater sectoral specialization.
In di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008), we argue that countries specializing in especially risky sectors
will experience higher macroeconomic volatility than countries exporting in less volatile sectors.
While the results in these two papers are informative, the use of sector-level data implies that we
cannot be precise about the specic mechanisms at work in the trade-volatility link. Canals, Gabaix,
Vilarrubia and Weinstein (2007) analyze sector-level export data and demonstrate that exports are
highly undiversied, both across sectors and across destinations. Furthermore, they show that this
feature of export baskets can explain why aggregate macroeconomic variables cannot account for
much of the movements in the current account. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) use the heterogeneous
3rms model to help account for several puzzles in international nance. Our paper diers from
this contribution in its focus on aggregate volatility instead of the behavior of prices. In addition,
while the Ghironi and Melitz model analyzes the consequences of a persistent aggregate shock,
in this paper we study rm-level idiosyncratic shocks instead. Finally, while Ghironi and Melitz
build a two-country model and conrm its quantitative relevance by generating impulse response
functions matched to U.S. data, our multi-country model and quantitative approach seek to explain
cross-country dierences.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework.
Section 3 simulates the model economy and presents the main quantitative and empirical results.
Section 4 presents robustness checks and results based on model perturbations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
Consider a model in the spirit of Melitz (2003), but with a discrete number of goods as in Krugman













pi (k)ci (k) = Xi;
where ci(k) is consumption of good k in country i, pi(k) is the price of this good, Xi is total
expenditure in the economy, and Ji is the number of varieties consumed in country i, coming from














There is one factor of production, labor, with country endowments given by Li, i = 1;:::;N.
Each country has a xed number of potential (but not actual) entrepreneurs  Ii.6 Each potential
5Alessandria and Choi (2007) provide another analysis of the impact of rm entry and exit decisions on the
macroeconomy. They build a two-country model calibrated to the U.S. data, and analyze the impact of an aggregate
shock on the extensive margin of exports. In their model, rm-specic productivity displays no persistence, and the
economy is not granular: idiosyncratic shocks to rms average out completely.
6For analytical convenience, we adopt a xed number of potential entrants as in Chaney (2008) rather modeling
free entry as in Melitz (2003). This is because with free entry, one would have to solve jointly for the wages and the
equilibrium number of rms in each country, doubling the number of equations and unknowns.
4entrepreneur can produce a unique CES variety, and thus has some market power: it faces the
demand for its variety given by (1). There are both xed and variable costs of production and
trade. The timing in this economy is given in Figure 2. At the beginning of the period, each
potential entrant k = 1;:::;  Ii in each i = 1;:::;N learns its type, which is the marginal cost
a(k). On the basis of this cost, each entrepreneur in country i decides whether or not to pay the
xed cost of production fii, and which, if any, export markets to serve. To start exporting from
country j to country i, a rm must pay the xed cost fij, and an iceberg per-unit cost of ij > 1.7
We normalize the iceberg cost of domestic sales to one: ii = 1. Having paid the xed costs of
entering these markets, the rm learns the realization of transitory shock z(k).8 We assume that
z(k) are i.i.d. across rms. Once all of the uncertainty has been realized, each rm produces with
a marginal cost a(k)z(k), markets clear, and consumption takes place.
Note that the assumptions we put on the timing of events, namely that the decision to enter
markets takes place before z(k) is realized, implies that the realization of the rm-specic transitory
shock does not aect the equilibrium number of rms in each market. This simplication lets us
analyze the equilibrium production allocation as an approximation around a case in which the
variance of z is zero. That is, we abstract from the extensive margin of exports, and entry and
exit of rms in response to transitory shocks.9 This simplication delivers substantial analytical
convenience, while it is unlikely to aect the results. This is because the focus of the paper is on the
role of the largest rms in generating aggregate volatility, and the largest rms are inframarginal:
their entry decision is unlikely to be aected by the realization of the transitory shock. Note also
that this timing assumption implies that our analytical approach is akin to the common one of
analyzing the response to shocks in deviations from a non-stochastic steady state.
Let wj be the wage paid to workers in country j. Firm k from country j selling to country i faces
a demand curve given by (1), and has a marginal cost ijwja(k)z(k) of serving this market. As is well
known, prot maximizing price is a constant markup over marginal cost, pi(k) = "
" 1ijwja(k)z(k),




















Note that these are variable prots of a rm in country j from selling its good to country i only.
These expressions are valid for each country pair i;j, including domestic sales: i = j.
The production structure of the economy is pinned down by the number of rms from each
7That is, the rm in country j must ship ij > 1 units to country i in order for one unit of the good to arrive
there.
8The assumption that z(k) is transitory is not crucial for the basic qualitative results in this paper. We adopt it
mainly for analytical convenience.
9The adjustment in the extensive margin in response to shocks has been studied by Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
and Alessandria and Choi (2007).
5country that enter each market. In particular, there is a cuto marginal cost aij, above which
rms in country j do not serve market i. We assume (and later verify in the calibration exercise),
that all rms that decide to export abroad are suciently productive to also serve their domestic
markets. On the other hand, there is a range of productivities for which rms serve their domestic
markets, but choose not to export. In this case, rms with marginal cost above aii in country i do





ij(a(k)z(k))   wjfij j a = aij

= 0:
To go forward with the analysis, we make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 The marginal entrepreneur is small enough that it ignores the impact of its own
realization of z(k) on the total expenditure Xi and the price level Pi in all potential destination
markets i = 1;:::;N.
Assumption 2 The marginal entrepreneur treats Xi and Pi as xed (non-stochastic).
The rst assumption is not controversial, and has been made in the literature since Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980). The second assumption allows us to take Xi and Pi outside
of the expectation operator. It amounts to assuming that the entrepreneur ignores the volatility
of GDP and in
ation when deciding to enter a market.10 Under these two assumptions, plugging
in the variable prots (3) and taking the expectation over z, the zero cuto prot condition for





























Closing the model involves nding expressions for aij, Pi, and wi for all i;j = 1;:::;N. The













where Iij is the number of varieties exported from country j to country i. As an approximation, we
solve for the equilibrium production allocation and the price levels ignoring rm-specic transitory















a(k)1 " j a < aij

: (5)
10This assumption may be questioned given the focus on large rms in this paper. However, what is crucial in
solving for equilibrium is the behavior of the marginal rm, which is small.
6In order to solve the model, we must make a distributional assumption on the a's:
Assumption 3 Labor productivity, 1=a, is Pareto(b;), where b is the minimum value labor pro-
ductivity can take, and  regulates dispersion.
It is then straightforward to show that the marginal cost, a, has a distribution function G(a) = (ba).
Furthermore, following Helpman et al. (2004), we dene V (y) =
R y
0 a1 "dG(a) = b
 (" 1)y (" 1).
The expression V (aij) is useful for writing the price levels and total prots in the economy. This
implies that Ea
 





The number of actual entrants into market i from market j is Iij =  IjG(aij). As a result, the


















































Having expressed Pi, and aij in terms of Xi and wi, for all i;j = 1;:::;N, it remains to close the
model by solving for the Xi's and wi's. To do this, we impose balanced trade for each country, and
use the convenient property that total prots in the economy are a constant multiple of Xi.
Proposition 1 Total prots of rms based in country i are a constant multiple of total expenditure:
i = " 1
" Xi.
Proof: See Appendix A.













































7Using the trade balance conditions, Xi =
PN
j=1 Xji for each i = 1;:::;N, as well as the expression


























i = 1;:::;N. There are N 1 independent equations in this system, which can be solved numerically
for wages in N   1 countries given a num eraire wage in the remaining country. We will solve it
numerically in order to carry out the main quantitative exercise in this paper.
2.1 Power Law in Firm Size, Granularity, and Aggregate Volatility
This economy is granular, that is, idiosyncratic shocks to rms result in aggregate 
uctuations, if
the distribution of rm size follows a power law with the exponent suciently close to 1 in absolute
value. Denote by lower case x(a(k);z(k)) the sales of an individual rm k. Firm sales x in the
economy must conform to:
Pr(x > s) = cs ; (9)
where  is close to 1.
It turns out that the baseline Melitz-Pareto model delivers a power law in rm size. In this
section, we demonstrate the power law in an autarkic economy, and then discuss how the distribu-
tion of rm size is aected by international trade. In our model, the expected sales of a rm as a
function of its marginal cost are: x(a) = Ca1 ", where the constant C re
ects the size of domes-
tic demand, and we drop the country subscripts. Under the assumption that 1=a Pareto(b;),





. Therefore, the power law follows:











































" 1 and  = 
" 1. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3. In





. Thus, our economy will be granular
if 
" 1 is close enough to 1, which appears to be the case in practice (see Axtell 2001).
We now derive the expression for aggregate volatility in our economy. Note that there are no
aggregate shocks in the model, only the rm-specic idiosyncratic shocks. A rm with marginal


















8where ~ z  z1 ". We already assumed that Ez (~ z) = 1, and now we further suppose that Varz (~ z) =















Appendix B shows that the variance of the growth rate of aggregate sales, or more precisely of the







where h is the Herndahl index of production shares of rms in this economy, h =
PI
k=1 h(k)2.
This is a familiar expression for the variance of a sum of random variables, and is the same as the
one used by Gabaix (2005).
Note that granular volatility only has a chance to be quantitatively relevant if the distribution
of rm size is suciently fat-tailed. In this case, Gabaix (2005) shows that the conventional Law of
Large Numbers fails, and asymptotics are instead governed by a version of Levy's Theorem, with
much slower convergence as the number of rms increases. This implies that idiosyncratic shocks
to individual (large) rms average out much more slowly. In the simulation below, we calibrate the
exponent of the power law distribution in rm size to available estimates. Equation (13) forms the
basis of the quantitative exercise below. We will simulate the world economy with a large number
of rms in each country, and calculate how the Herndahl indices change due to international
trade. This will reveal the contribution of international trade to aggregate (granular) volatility of
individual countries as a function of their characteristics.
How does international trade aect the distribution of rm size and therefore aggregate volatil-
ity? As rst demonstrated by Melitz (2003), the distribution of rm size becomes more unequal
under trade: compared to autarky, the least productive rms exit, and only the most productive
rms export abroad. Due to competition from foreign varieties, domestic sales and prots decrease.
Thus, as a country opens to trade, sales of most rms shrink, while the largest rms grow larger
as a result of exporting.11 Figure 3 depicts this eect. In the two-country case, there is a single
productivity cuto, above which rms export abroad. Compared to autarky, there is a higher
11Firm-level studies of dynamic adjustment to trade liberalization appear to nd empirical support for these
predictions. Pavcnik (2002) provides evidence that trade liberalization led to a shift in resources from the least to
the most productive rms in Chile. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2003a) show that a fall in trade costs leads to both
exit by the least productive rms and entry by rms into export markets. In addition, existing exporters ship more
abroad.
9probability of nding larger rms above this cuto. In the N-country case, with multiple export
markets there will be cutos for each market, with progressively more productive rms exporting
to more and more markets and growing larger and larger relative to domestic GDP. Thus, if the
distribution of rm sales follows a power law and the economy is granular, international trade has
the potential to increase the size of the largest rms, in eect creating a \hyper-granular" econ-
omy, with clear implications for the relationship between trade openness and aggregate volatility.
While qualitatively this result is a straightforward consequence of the baseline model of trade with
heterogeneous rms, the key question is how important this mechanism is quantitatively. This is
what we turn to in the next section.
Before describing the simulation results, it is important to discuss the empirical validity of the
assumption embedded in equation (13), namely that the volatility of the proportional change in
rm sales, , is invariant to the rm size x. If the volatility of sales decreases suciently fast in
rm size, larger rms will be so much less volatile that they will not impact aggregate volatility.
In fact, an economy in which larger rms are just agglomerations of smaller units each subject
to i.i.d. shocks is not granular: shocks to rms cannot generate aggregate 
uctuations. Several
papers estimated the relationship between rm size and rm volatility of the type  = Ax  using
Compustat data (see, e.g., Stanley et al. 1996 and Sutton 2002). The benchmark case in which
larger rms are simply collections of independent smaller rms would imply a value of  = 1=2,
and the absence of granular 
uctuations. Instead, the typical estimate of this parameter is about
1/6, implying that larger rms are not that much less volatile than smaller ones. Gabaix (2005)
argues that these estimates may not be reliable, since they are obtained using only data on the
largest listed rms. In addition, it is not clear whether estimates based on the U.S. reliably re
ect
the experience of other countries. Hence, our baseline analysis sets  = 0, and a value of  based
on the largest 100 listed rms in the U.S. In other words, we assume that all rms in the economy
have a volatility as low as largest rms in the economy. However, in the robustness Section 4, we
perform our analysis under the assumption that  = 1=6, and show that it does not appreciably
aect our results.12
12A related point concerns multi-product rms: if large rms sell multiple imperfectly correlated products, then the
volatility of the total sales for multiproduct rms will be lower than the volatility of single product rms. Evidence
suggests, however, that even in multiproduct rms the bulk of sales and exports is accounted for by a single product
line. Sutton (2002) provides evidence that in large corporations, the constituent business units themselves follow
a power law, with just a few very large business units and many much smaller ones. Along similar lines, Adalet
(2008) shows that in the census of New Zealand rms, only about 6.5% to 9.5% of output variation is explained by
the extensive margin (more products per rm), with the rest explained by the intensive margin (greater sales per
product).
103 Quantitative Evidence
3.1 A Model with Symmetric Countries
The solution to the multi-country model above is particularly simple when the countries are sym-
metric. Suppose that, for simplicity, Li = L,  Ii =  I, and the domestic costs of entry are all the same
as well: fii = f. Further, suppose that the trade costs are identical between each country-pair:
ij =  8i;j, and fij = fX 8i;j, with ii = 1 as a normalization. This is the setup considered in
the original Melitz (2003) paper.
When countries are symmetric, wages in all countries are the same, and we can normalize all
of them to 1: wi  1 8i. As a consequence, the total market size X = 1
1  " 1
"
wL is obviously the
same in all countries as well. The price level in each country is then given by:




























A number of things are worth noting about this expression. First, the only dierence between




(" 1) . Thus, since it is raised to a negative power, trade opening lowers the price
level compared to autarky. Since the nominal GDP expressed in units of num eraire is unchanged,
there are gains from trade. Note that the price level is ever lower, and the gains from trade ever
greater, as we increase the number of equal-sized countries in the world, N.
Armed with this expression for the price level, we can proceed to the key outcomes for us, which
are the cutos for domestic production and exporting. For domestic production, in each country i,










while the exporting cuto is:

















the only thing that changes the cutos as the country opens to trade or as the number of countries
increases is the price level P. As we argued above, P falls as the country opens to trade, lowering
the cuto for domestic production. Since aD is the marginal cost, this implies that the least
productive rms stop operating when the country opens to trade { the well known Melitz eect.
More importantly for us, aD keeps falling { the domestic production cuto becomes more and more
stringent { as the number of countries increases.
11Finally, aX < aD: only the most productive rms export. In the symmetric case, the expression
for the share of operating rms that export, G(aX)=G(aD), is particularly simple. Plugging in aD










This relation will become useful when we calibrate the xed cost of exporting fX relative to the
domestic entry cost f.
The world economy characterized by equations (14), (15), and (16) is particularly easy to
implement numerically. We proceed as follows. For a choice of parameter values (described below),
we obtain the cutos for producing and exporting. Then, we draw a marginal cost a for each of the
 I rms in the economy, and compute its expected sales, checking whether the rm with marginal
cost a produces and/or exports. Based on the gures for expected sales of each rm, we then





where h(k) is the share of rm k in total sales in the economy. Assuming the shocks to rms are
uncorrelated { there is no aggregate shock { the aggregate volatility in this economy is given by

p
h, where, as above,  is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to the rm, ~ z. This
is Gabaix's (2005) \granular" volatility. Since the simulation involves drawing rm productivities
randomly from a highly skewed distribution, we repeat the exercise 1001 times, and take the medians
of the values of interest.
We simulate the economy under the following parameter values (see Table 1 for a summary).
The elasticity of substitution is " = 6. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report available estimates
of this elasticity to be in the range of 3 to 10, and we pick a value close to the middle of the range.
The key parameter is , as it governs the slope of the power law. As described above, in this model
rm sales follow a power law with the exponent equal to 
" 1. In the data, rm sales follow a power
law with the exponent close to 1. Axtell (2001) reports the value of 1.06, which we use to nd 
given our preferred value of ":  = 1:06  ("   1) = 5:3. We set  = 2:86, which is the average of
ij's calculated using estimates from Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008).13
We set the number of potential entrants  I as follows. The simulation with N = 3 corresponds to
a case in which each country accounts for 1/3 of world GDP, as does the United States in the data.
13Though quite high, this value of  is in the same ballpark as the existing estimates of trade costs derived from
gravity models. It is a well-known puzzle that trade cost estimates based on volumes of trade are always found to be
larger than trade cost estimates based on price dierences across locations (for a discussion, see Anderson and van
Wincoop 2004). We choose gravity-based estimates because as we will see below, our quantitative model reproduces
observed trade volumes quite successfully when we use these trade costs.
12When N = 3, we thus set  I = 10;000;000, that is, there are ten million potential rms in each
country the size of the U.S. In this calibration it implies that there are about 9,500,000 operating
rms there. According to the 2002 U.S. Economic Census, there were 6,773,632 establishments
with a payroll in the United States. There are an additional 17,646,062 business entities that are
not employers, but they account for less than 3.5% of total shipments. Thus, while the U.S. may
have many more rms than what we assume here, ten million is a number suciently high as to let
us consider consequences of granularity. That is, an economy with 9,500,000 equal-sized rms has a
Herndahl index of about 0.0000001, leaving no possibility for generating granular 
uctuations. As
we increase the number of countries, we do so without increasing the overall number of potential
rms in the world. That is, in all simulations with N > 3,  I is set to 10;000;000  3=N. For
simplicity, we set L to the same value as  I in each instance.
In order to ensure an interior solution, we must make sure that the least productive rm does
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We set f to be 0.003 above that. This restriction implies that f equals about 1.2% of per capita
GDP. This is a low value of f. According to the World Bank's Doing Business Indicators Database
(The World Bank 2007a), setting up a business entails a bureaucratic cost of 0.5% of per capita
GDP in the United States. In most countries, however, this cost is considerably higher. Certainly,
higher levels of f will result in less diversication and higher granular volatility. In this application,
however, we choose to ignore the variation in xed costs of entry, so that we can focus more
squarely on the role of international trade. Given the values of  and f, we calibrate fX to match
the well known stylized fact that only about 20% of rms export (Bernard, Jensen, Redding and
Schott 2007). Equation (17) allows us to set fX. It is not clear how to pick b, which is the
minimum value that productivity can take. We set b = 0:1, which implies that roughly 95% of
potential entrepreneurs enter in autarky.
We simulate the model economy using these parameters for various numbers of countries, and
compare volatilities to the autarky case. (This is an exercise in the spirit of Alvarez and Lucas
2007.) The results are presented in Table 2. The rst column reports the number of countries;
the second, the median square root of the Herndahl index among the 1,001 simulations, and the
third column reports the ratio of aggregate volatilities under trade compared to autarky. The last
column assumes that the variance of rm-level shocks does not change as the country opens to
trade, in order to focus exclusively on the eects of increased granularity.
As noted above, when N = 3 each country accounts for about 1/3 of the world GDP, which is
roughly the size of the United States relative to the rest of the world. The (square root of) sales
Herndahl in the U.S., as reported in Gabaix (2005), is 0.062, only slightly lower than the 0.067
13implied by our parameterized model with N = 3, but very close to that value. Thus, in spite of the
assumption of only 10,000,000 rms, the model can reproduce quite well the observed concentration
of rm size.
It is clear that as the number of countries increases { that is, as the economy gets smaller relative
to the rest of the world { the distribution of rms becomes more and more concentrated. The the
square root of the median Herndahl with three countries is about 0.067. With ve countries, it
rises by about 10% to 0.072. With 50 countries, it is 0.09, and with 200 countries, 0.12, or nearly
twice as high as with N = 3. A striking feature of the results is that the contribution of international
trade to macroeconomic volatility increases dramatically as a country gets smaller relative to the
rest of the world. Our model implies that in a country like the U.S., macroeconomic volatility
is only about 0.2% higher than what it would be in complete absence of trade. By contrast, a
country that accounts for 1% of world GDP { which could be Belgium, South Korea, or Argentina
{ experiences volatility that is 1.1 times higher than what it would have been in autarky. A country
that accounts for 0.5% of GDP { Norway, Poland, or South Africa { experiences macroeconomic
volatility that is 1.18 times higher than without trade.
How do these results compare to the data? We estimated the relationship between macroeco-
nomic volatility and the share of world GDP in a large sample of countries. We took real, local
currency GDP per capita from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database (The
World Bank 2007b), and computed the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of this vari-
able over the period 1970-2006. The share of a country's GDP in world GDP is constructed based
on the nominal US dollar total GDP series from the same database. We compute each country's
share in world GDP for each year, and then take the average of this share over 1970-2006.
It turns out that doing the estimation in logs produces a better t (see also Canning et al. 1998).
The results are reported in Table 3. The univariate regression of log volatility on log world GDP
share yields an R2 of 19%, and the coecient is signicant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic of 4.66.
To ensure that we are not just picking up the well known negative relationship between per capita
income and volatility, we condition on log per capita income in column 2.14 This allows us to control
for many variables outside the model, such as the role of macroeconomic policy and institutional
quality, in a parsimonious way. It has been shown that these variables are important in explaining
macroeconomic volatility (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen 2003), and are
highly correlated with per-capita GDP.15 The overall country size is still highly signicant, though
the magnitude of the coecient is somewhat lower.
For maximum comparability to the non-symmetric multi-country simulation below, the above
14See Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), among others, for explanations of this negative relationship.
15Alternatively, we controlled for other possible covariates of macroeconomic volatility directly in addition to per
capita income. We included measures of economic and political institutions, government size, in
ation, nancial
development, and schooling. The results were robust to the inclusion of these additional controls.
14regressions are estimated on the sample of 49 largest countries by total GDP. To check that the
results are not unique to this particular sample, we re-estimated our specication on the largest
30, 75, and 100 economies by total GDP, as well as on the largest number of countries for which
the data were available, 143. Columns 3-6 of Table 3 show that results are robust. In addition,
we carried out non-parametric estimation to allow for a variable slope of this relationship, and the
results were quite similar.
We can now compare the relationship between volatility and country size found in the model
and the data. Figure 4 plots the estimated relationship between country size and volatility in the
data (after conditioning for per-capita GDP), as well as the same relationship implied by the model.
In both cases, the values are normalized by the implied volatility of the largest country, which is
the U.S. in the data, and the country accounting for 1/3 of world output in the model.
It is clear that the model matches over four-fths of the elasticity of volatility with respect to
country size found in the data. In the model, this elasticity is  0:121 (T), compared to  0:139
(GDP) in the data. In addition, this elasticity is quite close to what has been found in the
literature. Canning et al. (1998) report an estimate of  0:15  0:03. Our model implies that a
country accounting for 0.5% of world GDP has volatility about 1.75 times that of the U.S.
The negative relationship between volatility and country size is an intuitive consequence of
trade opening in this model. When the economy opens to trade, the largest and most productive
rms in both large and small economies will begin exporting and grow in size, making the economy
more granular. However, rms based in large countries such as the U.S. already face a large home
market, while in a small country the potential foreign market is far larger in size relative to the
domestic demand. Thus, a typical large rm in a small country will expand production by more in
response to trade opening than a corresponding rm located in a large country. As a result of this,
the same trade opening increases granularity by more in smaller countries.
More interesting are the counterfactual experiments we can perform with this model. In par-
ticular, as we increase the number of countries, the country size as measured by both  I and L
decreases. Thus, the simulation con
ates the role of country size per se and the role of openness.
While there is no way to separate the two in the data, in the model we can calculate how much
volatility would increase for smaller countries without any trade. Figure 4 plots the change in
aggregate volatility as a function of country size in autarky. We can see that without trade, the
model cannot match the observed relationship in the data. Instead of the elasticity of  0:121 in
the model with trade, without trade the relationship is much 
atter,  0:086 (A). Without trade,
the country that accounts for 0.5% of world GDP has volatility that is only 1.5 times higher than
the U.S. Thus, it appears that trade plays an important role in generating the relationship between
country size and volatility that we see in the real world.
To summarize, the model with a role for both country size and international trade matches
15quite well the estimated relationship between country size and volatility found in the data.
3.2 Multi-Country Model
Though the results obtained with symmetric countries are informative, we would like to exploit the
rich heterogeneity among the countries in the world. In order to do this, we numerically implement
the general multi-country model laid out in Section 2. We use information on country size and
trade barriers to solve the model, and then simulate the random draws of rm productivity to
compute the Herndahl indices of rm sales in each country. This will allow us to examine the
relationship between granular volatility and various country characteristics in the model, a well as
to evaluate the contribution of international trade to aggregate volatility in each country.
In order to fully solve the model numerically, we must nd the wages for each country, wi, using
the system of equations (8). To solve this system, we must calibrate the values of Li,  Ii, ij, and fij
for each country and country pair. For nding the values of Li, we follow the approach of Alvarez
and Lucas (2007). First, we would like to think of L not as population per se, but as \equipped
labor," to take explicit account of TFP and capital endowment dierences between countries. To
obtain the values of L that are internally consistent in the model, we start with an initial guess
for Li for all i = 1;:::;N, and use it to solve for the wages wi using equation (8). Given this
vector of wages, we update our guess for Li for each country in order to match the ratio of total
GDPs between each country i and the U.S.. Using the resulting values of Li, we solve for the
new set of wages, and iterate to convergence (for more on this approach, see Alvarez and Lucas
2007). Thus, our procedure generates vectors wi and Li in such a way as to match exactly the
relative total GDPs of the countries in the sample. In practice, the results are extremely close to
simply equating Li to the relative GDPs of the countries. In this procedure, we must normalize the
population of one of the countries. We thus set LUS to its actual value of 291 million as of 2003,
and compute Li of every other country relative to this U.S. value. Finally, we set  Ii in proportion
to Li. That is, the country's endowment of entrepreneurs is simply proportional to its \equipped
labor" endowment. An important consequence of this assumption is that countries with higher
TFP and capital abundance will have a greater number of potential productivity draws, all else
equal. This is an assumption adopted by Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Chaney (2008). We set
 IUS = 10;000;000, that is, there are ten million potential rms in the U.S. As discussed in the
symmetric calibration above, this is the right order of magnitude when compared to the number of
rms in the U.S. Economic Census, and high enough to rule out aggregate 
uctuations unless the
distribution of rm size is suciently skewed.
Next, we must calibrate the values of ij for each pair of countries. Rather than posit the same
value of  across all country pairs as we did in the simulation of the symmetric case, we use available
gravity estimates to obtain values of ij that dier across country pairs. We use two sets of gravity
16estimates. The rst comes from the empirical model of Helpman et al. (2008). That is, we combine
geographical characteristics such as bilateral distance, common border, common language, whether
the two countries are in a currency union and others, with the coecient estimates reported by
Helpman et al. (2008) to calculate values of ij for each country pair. As a robustness check, we
also compute ij using the estimates of Eaton and Kortum (2002). The advantage of the Helpman
et al. (2008) estimates is that they are obtained in an empirical model that accounts explicitly for
both xed and variable costs of exporting, and thus corresponds most closely to the theoretical
structure in our paper. Note that in this formulation, ij = ji for all i and j.
Finally, we must take a stand on the values of fii and fij. We do not have a good way to
calibrate these parameters. In addition, they cannot be calibrated separately from b, the minimum
productivity of the rms in the economy. Thus, as in the symmetric simulation above, we proceed
to set fii to a level just high enough to ensure an interior solution, which is (18) plus 0.003.
As mentioned above this value of fii is a rather low one, implying that some 95% of potential
entrepreneurs produce in the U.S.. Note that since  Ii is the same multiple of Li in every country,
fii is the same for all i in the baseline calibration. Further, we set fij = fii +fjj. That is, to enter
the export market the rm must pay the entry cost for both its own and the foreign market. This
is a very simple conguration of xed costs of entry and exporting. We opt for simplicity mainly
because we do not have a way to model a rich variation in fij between individual country pairs.
We then check that the bilateral trade volumes obtained by the model match up well with observed
trade data. Finally, we use the same values for ", , and b as the ones in the symmetric simulation
(see the third column Table 1 for a summary of the parameters used in the non-symmetric case).
We carry out the analysis on the sample of the largest 49 countries by total GDP, plus the 50th
that represents the rest of the world. These 49 countries together cover 97% of world GDP. We
exclude entrepot economies of Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which have total trade well in
excess of their GDP, due to signicant re-exporting activity. Thus, our model is not intended to
t these countries. (We do place them into the rest-of-the-world category). The country sample,
sorted by total GDP, is reported in Table 4.
3.3 Model Fit




wiLi for country i, for any two countries matches exactly the ratio of the total
GDPs in the data. However, since the object of the paper is to examine the role of trade openness
in aggregate volatility, it is more important that the model matches well the bilateral and overall
trade volumes observed in the data. Comparing bilateral trade patterns generated by the model
to the actual data is a good test of the model's success in describing the world economy, since the
calibration procedure does not use any information on actual trade patterns, only country GDPs
17and estimated bilateral trade costs.
Figure 5 reports the scatterplot of bilateral trade ratios ij = Xij=Xi. On the horizontal axis
is the natural log of ij that comes from the model, while on the vertical axis is the corresponding
value of that bilateral trade 
ow in the data. Hollow dots represent exports from one country to
another, ij, i 6= j. Solid dots, at the top of the scatterplot, represent sales of domestic rms as a
share of domestic absorption, ii. For convenience, we added a 45-degree line. It is clear that the
trade volumes implied by the model match the actual data well. Most observations are quite close
to the 45-degree line. It is especially important that we get the overall trade openness (1 ii) right,
since that will drive the contribution of trade to the granular volatility in each country. Figure 6
plots the actual values of (1 ii) against those implied by the model, along with a 45-degree line.
We can see that though the relationship is not perfect, is it quite close.
Table 5 compares the means and medians of ii and ij's for the model and the data, and
reports the correlations between the two. The correlation between domestic shares ii the model
and the data for this sample of countries is around 0.48. The means and the medians look very
similar as well, with the countries in the model slightly more open on average than the data. The
correlation between export shares, ij, is actually higher at 0.67.16
Overall, though the model calibration does not use any information on trade volumes, it ts
bilateral trade data quite well, suggesting that it will be informative about the role of trade in
aggregate volatility. This is what we turn to next.
3.4 Trade and Granular Volatility: a Quantitative Analysis
Having solved the model given the data on country GDPs and trade costs, we now simulate it using
random productivity draws for each rm in each economy. Namely, in each country i, we draw  Ii
productivities from a Pareto(b,) distribution. For each rm, we use the cutos aji for serving each
market j (including its own market j = i) given by equation (4) to determine whether the rm
operates, and which, if any, foreign markets it serves. We then calculate the total sales of each rm
as the sum of its sales in each market, and compute the Herndahl index of rm sales in country i.
Since the distribution of rm productivities gives rise to a highly skewed distribution of rm sales,
there is variation in the Herndahl index from simulation to simulation, even though we draw as
many as 10 million rms in a given country. We thus repeat the exercise 1001 times, and take the
median values of the Herndahl index in each country. In parallel, we also compute the Herndahl
index of rm sales in autarky for each country, given all the parameters. This counterfactual exercise
16We also experimented with increasing the number of countries in the simulation to 60. The model t the data
well, though it over-predicted the overall average trade openness of countries by slightly more than the 50-country
model. In addition, there are more zeros in bilateral trade data in the 60-country sample compared to the 50-country
one. (With 50 countries, among the 2500 possible unidirectional bilateral trade 
ows, only 18 are zeros.) For these
reasons we stick with the largest 49 countries in our analysis.
18allows us to gauge the contribution of international trade to aggregate volatility. Given these values
of the Herndahl index h, we can then construct each country's granular volatility under trade and
in autarky using the formula for total variance (13) and a realistic value of . Following Gabaix
(2005), we set  = 0:1, though since in this paper we will not exploit any variation in  across
countries, none of the results will be driven by this choice.
Since the number of rms  Ii is a parameter in our model, chosen to be at most 10,000,000 due
to computational constraints, we must check that the resulting Herndahl indices are not too high.
In our simulation, the square root of the Herndahl index for the U.S. is
p
hUS = 0:068, which is
quite close to the value of 0.062 reported in Gabaix (2005). Thus, choosing a value of  Ii that is
unrealistically low relative to the total number of rms in the U.S. economy does not result in an
economy that is too undiversied compared to the data.
How well does the model predict the actual GDP volatility found in the data? Table 6 presents
regressions of actual volatility of GDP growth over the period 1970-2006 against the one predicted by
the model (T). Column (1) includes no controls. We can see that the t is not perfect (R2 = 0:15),
but the relationship is clearly positive and signicant. Interestingly, the slope coecient in this
specication is virtually 1. The second column includes GDP per capita. The t of the model
improves, and though the coecient on the model volatility drops, it remains signicant at the
1% level. The next two columns include measures of export structure volatility and production
specialization, since opening to trade can impact aggregate volatility through a change in these
variables. Column (3) adds the risk content of exports, which captures the overall riskiness of a
country's export structure.17 The model volatility remains signicant, and the R2 of the regression
is now 0.40. Finally, a measure of production specialization for the manufacturing sector (Herndahl
of production shares) is included in the fourth column.18 The number of observations drops to 35
due to limited data availability, but the model volatility still remains signicant.
As would be expected, the level of granular volatility is lower than what is observed in the data.
Column 1 of Table 7 reports the ratio of the granular volatility implied by the model to the actual
GDP volatility found in the data. It ranges between 0.12 and 0.70, with a value of 0.35 for the United
States, almost identical to what Gabaix (2005) nds using a very dierent methodology. Note that
the variation in aggregate volatility in the model across countries is generated by dierences in
country size as well as variation in bilateral trade costs. That gives us a glimpse of how important
those two things are to aggregate volatility, when applied through the granular channel.
How much of the elasticity of the aggregate volatility with respect to country size can the
model explain? We now return to the exercise performed in the symmetric simulation, and plot the
17This measure is sourced from di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008). A country's export structure can be volatile
due to a lack of diversication and/or exporting in sectors that are more volatile.
18This measure is calculated using the UNIDO database of sectoral production, and sourced from di Giovanni and
Levchenko (2007).
19predicted volatility as a function of country size in the data and the model. Figure 7 reports the
results. Note that since the level of aggregate volatility in the model does not match up with the
level in the data, this graph is only informative about the comparison of slopes, not intercepts. As
estimated above, in the data the elasticity of GDP volatility with respect to country size is  0:139
(GDP). Our calibrated model produces an elasticity of  0:137 (T), which is extremely close to
the one in the data though slightly below it in absolute terms. We can also calculate what this
relationship would look like in the absence of trade. Figure 7 reports the volatility-size relationship
in autarky. We conclude that country size alone cannot account for what we observe in the data.
The elasticity of volatility with respect to country size in autarky is just  0:097 (A), considerably
lower than the  0:139 in the data.
In addition to assessing the model's implications for aggregate GDP volatility, we can also ask
whether the model replicates the salient features of the rm size distributions across countries found
in the data. Doing this type of exercise requires rm-level data for a large number of countries.
Currently, multi-country rm-level databases with comprehensive coverage are not readily available.
Appendix D uses ORBIS, the largest public non-proprietary rm-level database, to assess whether
the implications of the model regarding the rm size distributions are consistent with the data.
Though the ORBIS database contains some 50 million rms, coverage is uneven across countries
and years, limiting the reliability of this exercise. Nonetheless, the Appendix shows that the model
closely matches a number of rm-level patterns in the data.
3.4.1 Counterfactual I: The Impact of Trade Openness on Volatility
We now assess the contribution of international trade to the aggregate granular volatility in our
sample of countries. Our model yields not only the predicted granular volatility in the simulated
trade equilibrium, but also the granular volatility of autarky. Table 7 reports the ratio of the two
in each country in the sample. In the table, countries are ranked by overall size, in descending
order. We can see that international trade contributes very little to overall GDP volatility in the
U.S.. The country is so large and trade volumes are so low that its volatility under trade is only
1.037 times higher than it would be in complete absence of trade. By contrast, smaller countries
experience substantially higher volatility as a result of trade openness. For instance, in a country
like Ireland, the volatility under trade is some 32 percent higher than it would be in autarky.
3.4.2 Counterfactual II: The Impact of Further Reduction in Trade Costs in All
Countries
Having computed what granular volatility would be in the absence of trade, we next carry out the
opposite counterfactual experiment: a reduction in trade costs. It would not be very informative
to consider totally free trade (ij = 1 8i;j), since it is unrealistic to model a case in which distance
20between countries does not aect trade costs, for instance. In this section, we simulate a halving
of ad valorem trade costs. This is still a substantial reduction in barriers, that leads to a dramatic
increase in the volume of trade. When the model was calibrated to the data, the median domestic
sales as a share of domestic absorption ii was equal to 0.72, which matches the actual data
reasonably well. When trade costs decrease by 50%, ii drops to 0.23, representing a threefold
increase in world trade as a share of absorption.
Column 3 of Table 7 reports, for each country, the percentage increase in granular volatility
resulting from this reduction in trade costs. We would expect that a further expansion of trade is
likely to increase volatility as countries become progressively more specialized. The model predicts
that this expansion of trade leads to an increase in granular volatility of 21% on average in this
sample of countries. This eect is most pronounced in small and remote countries, as a reduction in
trade costs aects them most strongly. The maximum increase, 29%, is predicted to occur in New
Zealand, followed by Chile, Thailand, and the Philippines. By contract, the impact is much more
muted in countries of similar size but not remote: Ireland and Belgium are both in the bottom ve
countries, experiencing an increase of 13 and 15% respectively. Predictably, the largest economies
experience the smallest increase in granular volatility as a result of further trade opening. The
bottom two countries by estimated impact are U.S. and Japan. Note, however, that even for those
countries, the impact of the further reduction in trade barriers is more dramatic than the impact
of trade so far. For both U.S. and Japan, we calculated that trade increases aggregate volatility by
about 3.5-4% compared to autarky. The 50% reduction in trade barriers implies a further increase
of 8.5-10% over the status quo.
To better summarize these range of country experiences and possible trade cost reductions,
Columns (1) through (4) of Table 8 report the distribution of increases in granular volatility in our
set of countries coming from a 10%, 25%, 50% and a 75% reduction in ij. Not surprisingly, in this
range of trade costs, greater reductions lead to uniform increases in granular volatility throughout
the distribution of countries.
3.4.3 Counterfactual III: The Impact of Further Reduction in Trade Costs in a Single
Country
It is also informative to compute the volatility impact of a reduction in trade costs for an individual
country, holding all third-country trade costs constant. From an individual country's perspective,
this counterfactual experiment could be a proxy for a comprehensive liberalization program, or
for joining a free trade agreement such as the WTO. To do this exercise, we run the simulation
reducing trade costs by 50% for each individual country one-by-one. Column (4) of Table 7 reports
the results. The main conclusion from this exercise is that the increase in volatility experienced
by a country when its trade costs decrease is similar in magnitude, but always slightly larger than
21the increase in granular volatility coming from a full multilateral liberalization. This result is quite
striking, and the intuition for it is as follows. When a country's trade costs decrease, domestic
large rms nd it easier to penetrate foreign markets. This familiar eect acts to make the largest
rms larger, thereby increasing granular volatility. When the liberalization is multilateral, there is
also an eect that acts in the opposite direction: rms from all other countries also nd it easier to
penetrate each market. Thus, in a multilateral liberalization, the price level decreases dramatically
in each country, making it more competitive and reducing demand for each rm's good. However,
when a liberalization is unilateral, this second eect is absent. As trade costs drop, the size of the
domestic exporters increases by more than it would under a multilateral reduction in trade costs.
Therefore, the impact on granular volatility is that much greater. Columns (5) through (8) of Table
8 show the increases in aggregate volatility due to single-country trade cost reductions of various
sizes, from 10% to 75%. Once again, we see that the magnitudes involved are uniformly greater
than those in a multilateral liberalization.
4 Robustness Checks and Model Perturbations
4.1 Volatility Varying with Firm Size
An assumption that makes the analysis above possible is that the volatility of the proportional
change in sales, , does not change in rm size x. As discussed at the end of Section 2, if rm-
level volatility decreases sharply enough in size, shocks to large rms will not generate aggregate
volatility. In practice, however, the negative relationship between rm size and volatility of its sales
is not very strong. Stanley et al. (1996) and Sutton (2002) estimate the relationship of the type
 = Ax , and nd a value of  = 1=6. That is, rm-level volatility does decrease with size, but
this elasticity is quite low. To check robustness of our results, we allow the rm-specic volatility














where, once again, x(k) are sales of rm k, while h(k) is the share of rm k's sales in total output
in the economy.
The rest of the simulation remains unchanged. Since we are not matching the level of aggregate
volatility, just the contribution of trade, we do not need to posit a value of the constant A. However,
it would be easy to calibrate to match the volatility of the top 100 rms in the U.S. as reported by
Gabaix (2005), for example. Note that compared to the baseline simulation, modeling a decreasing
relationship between country size and volatility is a double-edged sword: while larger rms may
be less volatile as a result, smaller rms are actually more volatile. This implies that the impact
22of international trade will not necessarily be more muted when we make this modication to the
basic model.
Table 9 reports the results of this robustness check in column 1. We can see that the impact
of allowing large rms to have lower volatility is minimal. The contribution of trade to granular
volatility is virtually the same: while in the baseline simulation trade increases aggregate volatility
by 21%, when volatility is allowed to vary by rm, the corresponding increase is 24%. Somewhat
surprisingly, therefore, allowing volatility to decrease in rm size implies a larger contribution of
trade to aggregate volatility, not a smaller one. In fact, this is the case in every country in the
sample save the U.S.
4.2 Robustness to Parameter Changes
We now discuss two further sensitivity checks we performed on the model. The rst is to use
an alternative parametrization of bilateral iceberg costs ij. Instead of using the Helpman et al.
(2008) empirical model we use instead that of Eaton and Kortum (2002). The latter employs fewer
explanatory variables, and breaks up the bilateral distance variable into discrete intervals rather
than using it as a continuous variable. The resulting estimated iceberg trade costs are considerably
lower than those implied by the baseline model. While the mean ij resulting from the Helpman
et al. (2008) estimates is 2.86, the average iceberg cost implied by Eaton and Kortum (2002) is
2.18. Table 9, column 2 reports the contribution of trade to aggregate volatility implied by the
model with Eaton and Kortum (2002) trade costs. Predictably, since the trade costs are lower, the
contribution of trade to aggregate volatility is higher. In fact, the average increase implied by these
alternative trade costs is 41%, about twice the 21% value in the baseline simulation.
Finally, we attempt to calibrate cross-country variations in domestic xed costs, fii, using data.
The level of fUS;US is set to ensure an interior solution for the domestic production cuto. Then,
we use the information on the costs of entry from The World Bank (2007a) to set fii for every
other country relative to the U.S.. In this application, the particular Doing Business indicator
is the amount of time required to set up a business. We favor this indicator compared to others
that measure entry costs either in dollars or in units of per capita income, because in our model
fii is a quantity of inputs rather than value. To be precise, if according to the Doing Business
Indicators database, in country i it takes 10 times longer to register a business than in the U.S.,
then fii = 10  fUS;US. Further, as in our baseline, we set fij = fii + fjj. That is, to enter the
export market the rm must pay the entry cost for both its own and the foreign market. Column 3
of Table 9 reports the contribution of trade to aggregate volatility under this conguration of xed
costs. The results are very similar, with the average increase in aggregate volatility due to trade of
26% (compared to 21% in the baseline case).
235 Conclusion
Recent literature in both macroeconomics and international trade has focused attention on the role
of rms. We now know that international trade is mostly carried out by the largest rms (Bernard
et al. 2007), and these rms are relatively more important in the overall economy because of their
exporting activity (Melitz 2003). It turns out that large rms also matter for the macroeconomy.
Gabaix (2005) demonstrates that if the distribution of rm size follows a power law with an exponent
close to  1 { which appears to be the case in the data { shocks to the largest rms can lead to
aggregate 
uctuations, which are dubbed \granular."
This paper argues that openness to international trade can have an impact on aggregate 
uctu-
ations by increasing the relative importance of large rms and in eect making the economy more
granular. While anecdotal evidence on the macro importance of large exporting rms abounds, our
main goal is quantitative. We calibrate and simulate a multi-country model of rm-level production
and trade that can generate granular 
uctuations. The model matches quite well both the observed
bilateral trade volumes, as well as the elasticity of GDP volatility with respect to country size. The
counterfactual exercises reveal that the contribution of international trade to aggregate volatility
varies a great deal depending on country characteristics. While it is minimal in large, relatively
closed economies like the U.S. or Japan, trade increases volatility by as much as 30-40% in small
open economies such as Belgium, Poland, or Romania. In addition, our calculations show that a
further reduction in trade costs could increase aggregate volatility by as much as a further 30% in
some countries.
Recent research incorporates heterogeneous rms into fully dynamic general equilibrium macroe-
conomics models, focusing on the impact of persistent aggregate shocks and rm entry and exit
(Ghironi and Melitz 2005, Alessandria and Choi 2007). The importance of rm-specic idiosyncratic
shocks for macroeconomic volatility via the granular channel emphasized in this paper should be
viewed as complementary to this work. Future research incorporating these dierent mechanisms,
as well as bringing disaggregated data to the models, will help provide an even more complete
picture of the macroeconomic impact of trade integration.
24Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1































The total xed costs paid by rms in country i to enter market j are equal to fjiwi Ii (baji)
.
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Therefore, the total xed costs paid by rms in i to export to j are a constant multiple of Xji:
 Ij (baji)
 wifji =





Therefore, the total prots from selling to j from country i are:
ji = V
ji  


























Since in equilibrium total income equals total expenditure in each country, Xi =
PN
j=1 Xji, leading
to the result that i =
(" 1)
" Xi.
25Appendix B Aggregate Volatility Derivation
Given the expression for the actual sales of the rm with a transitory shock z in (10), and the
expected sales of the rm with productivity a in (11), the actual sales as an approximation around
Ez [x(a;z)] are:







Therefore, the proportional change in x(a;z), or the growth rate, is given by:
x(a;z)
Ez (x(a;z))
= ~ z   1;







The total sales in the economy are given by (12), thus the change in the total sales relative to the





















































where h(k) is the share of the rm k's sales in total sales. As expected, the volatility of total output
in the economy is equal to the volatility of an individual rm's output times the Herndahl index
of production shares.
Appendix C Data Description and Sources
Data on total GDP come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database (The
World Bank 2007b). In order to compute the share of each country in world GDP, we compute
shares of each country in world GDP expressed in nominal U.S. dollars in each year over the period
261970-2006, and take the average share over this period. To compute the GDP volatility, we compute
the yearly growth rates of GDP expressed in constant local currency units, and take the standard
deviation of that growth rate over 1970-2006. We also use the real PPP-adjusted per capita GDP
gures from The World Bank (2007b) to control for the overall level of development in Section 3.
To obtain values ij following the estimates of Helpman et al. (2008) and Eaton and Kortum
(2002), we use data on bilateral distance, common border, whether the country is an island or
landlocked, common language, and colonial ties from Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et Informations
Internationales (CEPII). Data on legal origins come from La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998). Finally, information on currency unions and free-trade areas come from Rose (2004),
and supplemented by internet searches whenever needed.
Appendix D Model Fit to Firm-Level Data
In the main text of the paper, we evaluate the t of the calibrated model to observed bilateral
and overall trade volumes and to the elasticity of aggregate volatility with respect to country size
found in the data. However, the model also makes predictions about the features of the rm size
distributions across countries that are important for the central mechanism of the paper. This
Appendix uses a large cross-country rm-level database to compare the predictions of the model
at the rm level to available data. While this exercise is informative, we do not include it in the
main text of the paper due to concerns about data quality. Though we use the largest available
non-proprietary rm-level database in this analysis, coverage is quite uneven across countries and
years, implying that measures of concentration may not be reliable or comparable across countries.
Nonetheless, as we describe below, the model is quite consistent with the rm-level patterns found
in the data.
To compare the model predictions regarding the rm size distribution to the data, we use
ORBIS, a large multi-country database published by Bureau van Dijk that contains information on
more than 50 million companies worldwide. The data come from a variety of sources, including, but
not limited to, registered lings and annual reports. Coverage varies by world region: there are data
on some 17 million companies in the U.S. and Canada, 22 million companies in the 46 European
countries, 6.2 million companies from Central and South America, 5.3 million from Asia, but only
260,000 from Africa and 45,000 from the Middle East. Importantly, the database includes both
publicly traded and privately held rms. For 41 European countries, the AMADEUS database also
published by Bureau van Dijk contains similar information but often has better coverage (more
rms). In addition, the data in AMADEUS appear more standardized across countries. Thus,
for countries with better coverage and data quality in AMADEUS compared to ORBIS, we use
information from the former database.
27While in principle data are available going back to mid-1990s for some countries, coverage
improves dramatically for more recent years. For this reason, we focus our analysis on 2006, the
year with the most observations available. The main variable used in the analysis is total sales.
We rst assess whether the rm-level indices of concentration in the data behave in the way
predicted by the model. To that end, we calculate the Herndahl indices of rm sales in each
country, and regress those on the share of the country in world GDP (the main indicator of country
size used throughout the paper), as well as per capita income to control for the level of development.
Panel A of Table A1 reports the results. The rst column uses all 113 countries for which it is
possible to calculate the Herndahl index in ORBIS-AMADEUS data. The second column restricts
the sample to those countries for which there are at least 100 rms; the third column, at least 1,000
rms. The last column reports the same relationship in the calibrated multi-country model. In
the data, the relationship between concentration and country size is highly statistically signicant,
even controlling for the level of development. At the same time, comparing the slope coecients in
the data to those implied by the model, we can see that the relationship between the concentration
and country size is if anything more pronounced in the data than in the model.
The Herndahl index is the variable most relevant to the quantitative results in the paper.
However, because ideally it requires information on the entire rm size distribution, the Herndahl
index may also suer the most from the incomplete coverage problems in the ORBIS-AMADEUS
database. Because of this, we also check the model t using two other indicators of rm size: the
combined sales of the largest 10 rms in the country, and the size of the single largest rm. Because
these indicators focus on the very largest rms that are measured more reliably in the data, the
problems of coverage are less severe.
Panel B of Table A1 compares the relationship between the combined size of the 10 largest
rms to country size in the data to the model. There is a signicant positive relationship between
the absolute size of the largest 10 rms and country size: not susprisingly, larger countries have
bigger rms. Thus, qualitatively, the data agree with the model. The magnitudes of the coecients
in the data and the model are quite similar as well, especially in the widest sample of countries.
Compared to the coecients in the more selective samples (columns 2 and 3), the model actually
underpredicts the relative size of large rms in small countries. The smaller slope coecient in the
data compared to the model means that in the data, large rms in small countries are actually
larger than the model predicts, relative to country size and relative to the U.S.. If anything, this
probably implies that we underpredict granular volatility in smaller countries, relative to the U.S..
Panel C reports the analogous results for the size of the single largest rm in each country. The
conclusions are virtually the same as in Panel B.
We conclude that overall, the predictions of the model regarding these aspects of the rm size
distribution across countries match fairly well the patterns observed in the data.
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a  = 1:06("   1), where 1.06 is the power law exponent estimated for U.S. rm sales by
Axtell (2001).
b ij = ji.












" 1 = 0:2. Non-Symmetric
Case: fij = fii + fjj.
e L is solved endogenously with w. We solve relative to the U.S., where LUS = 291;000;000.
f  I is set proportional to L. We solve relative to the U.S., where  IUS = 10;000;000.
 This column represents the baseline case. The \same-size" symmetric case holds L and  I
constant at 10e6 for each country, regardless of the size of N.
 This column represents the baseline case. Robustness checks include (1)  varying with
rm sales:  = Ax , where  = 1=6; (2) ij based on estimates from Eaton and Kortum
(2002), so that ij 2 [1.39, 2.55]; (3) " is set to 4 or 8, which in turn implies that  equals
3.18 or 7.42, respectively.
32Table 2. Symmetric Model Simulation Results
















Notes: This table reports the square root of the Herndahl index of rm shares (
p
h) for trade equilibrium,
and the ratio of volatility under trade to the volatility under autarky. The values are medians based on 1001
simulations of the symmetric model for each number of countries.
Table 3. GDP Volatility and Country Size Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var: GDP Volatility
Share -0.177** -0.139** -0.090+ -0.209** -0.180** -0.142**
(0.038) (0.044) (0.045) (0.035) (0.027) (0.023)
Income -0.157* -0.261** -0.049 -0.019 0.018
(0.069) (0.070) (0.057) (0.045) (0.037)
Constant -4.352** -2.696** -1.533+ -4.010** -4.154** -4.291**
(0.190) (0.763) (0.773) (0.601) (0.473) (0.410)
Observations 49 49 30 75 100 143
R2 0.192 0.273 0.337 0.328 0.296 0.225
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%.
All variables are in natural logarithms. The dependent variable is the log of the standard deviation of per
capita GDP growth over the period 1970-2006. Share is a country's GDP relative to world GDP; Income is
PPP-adjusted per capita income. All right-hand side variables are averages over 1970-2006.
33Table 4. Top 49 Countries and the Rest of the World in Terms of 2004 GDP
GDP/ GDP/
Country World GDP Country World GDP
United States 0.300 Indonesia 0.006
Japan 0.124 South Africa 0.006
Germany 0.076 Norway 0.006
France 0.054 Poland 0.005
United Kingdom 0.044 Finland 0.005
Italy 0.041 Greece 0.004
China 0.028 Venezuela, RB 0.004
Canada 0.026 Thailand 0.004
Brazil 0.021 Portugal 0.003
Spain 0.020 Colombia 0.003
India 0.017 Nigeria 0.003
Australia 0.016 Algeria 0.003
Russian Federation 0.015 Israel 0.003
Mexico 0.015 Philippines 0.003
Netherlands 0.015 Malaysia 0.002
Korea, Rep. 0.011 Ireland 0.002
Sweden 0.010 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.002
Switzerland 0.010 Pakistan 0.002
Belgium 0.009 Chile 0.002
Argentina 0.008 New Zealand 0.002
Saudi Arabia 0.007 Czech Republic 0.002
Austria 0.007 United Arab Emirates 0.002
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.007 Hungary 0.002
Turkey 0.007 Romania 0.002
Denmark 0.006 Rest of the World 0.027
Notes: Ranking of top 49 countries and the rest of the world in terms of 2004 U.S.$ GDP. We include Hong
Kong, POC, and Singapore in Rest of the World. Source: The World Bank (2007b).
34Table 5. Bilateral Trade Shares: Data and Model Predictions for the 50-Country Sample
model data








Notes: This table reports the means and medians of domestic output (top panel), and bilateral trade (bottom
panel), both as a share of domestic absorption, in the model and in the data. Source: International Monetary
Fund (2007).
Table 6. GDP and Granular Volatility: Data and Non-Symmetric Trade Model Predictions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var: GDP Volatility
T 1.078** 0.853** 0.617* 0.538+
(0.285) (0.297) (0.279) (0.280)
GDP-per-capita -0.176* -0.164* -0.199**
(0.067) (0.062) (0.052)
Risk Content of Exports 0.131* {
(0.061) {
Herndahl of Production -0.172
(0.252)
Constant 1.399 2.032 1.775 0.218
(1.298) (1.315) (1.291) (1.158)
Observations 49 49 47 35
R2 0.15 0.25 0.40 0.38
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at
1%. All variables are in natural logarithms. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of per capita
GDP growth over the period 1970-2006. T is the granular aggregate volatility implied by the simulated
model. GDP-per-capita is the PPP-adjusted per capita GDP. Risk Content of Exports is the measure of
the volatility of a country's export pattern sourced from di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008). Herndahl of












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Table A1. Cross-Country Evidence on the Relationship between Firm Sales' Distributions and
Country Size
(A) Dep. Variable: Herndahl
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All obs(S)100 obs(S)1000 Model
Share -0.349** -0.369** -0.192* -0.137**
(0.027) (0.064) (0.075) (0.006)
Income 0.024 0.087* 0.120* {
(0.026) (0.036) (0.053) {
Constant -4.210** -5.182** -4.974** -5.192**
(0.406) (0.567) (0.816) (0.032)
Observations 113 62 39 49
R2 0.61 0.42 0.24 0.91
(B) Dep. Variable: Sales of 10 Largest Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All obs(S)100 obs(S)1000 Model
Share 0.981** 0.640** 0.464+ 0.920**
(0.086) (0.155) (0.241) (0.004)
Income 0.033 0.085 0.173 {
(0.065) (0.094) (0.134) {
Constant 23.165** 21.169** 19.728** -0.829**
(0.927) (1.390) (1.949) (0.059)
Observations 112 62 39 49
R2 0.50 0.22 0.20 1.00
(C) Dep. Variable: Sales of Largest Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All obs(S)100 obs(S)1000 Model
Share 0.830** 0.570** 0.472* 0.922**
(0.087) (0.139) (0.216) (0.005)
Income 0.047 0.128 0.241+ {
(0.068) (0.095) (0.132) {
Constant 20.870** 18.896** 17.478** -1.932**
(0.942) (1.296) (1.746) (0.078)
Observations 113 62 39 49
R2 0.57 0.23 0.14 1.00
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + signicant at 10%; * signicant at 5%; ** signicant at
1%. All variables are in natural logarithms. The dependent variables are based on 2006 rm sales data from
ORBIS/AMADEUS. Column labeled `All' uses all available countries; columns `obs(S)100'/`obs(S)1000'
constrain the sample to countries with at least 100/1000 rm-sales observations. `Share' is a country's
GDP relative to world GDP; `Income' is PPP-adjusted per capita income. Column `Model' reports the
corresponding relationship in the calibrated model used in the paper.







Samsung  Hyundai 
Motor Co. 










Sales/GDP  Exports/Total Exports 
Notes: This table reports the sales of the top 10 Korean business groups, as a share of Korean GDP
(blue/dark bars) and total Korean exports (red/light bars). Source: Korean Development Institute.
40Figure 2. The Timing of the Economy
-
Each entrant k = 1;:::;I
nds out its type a, and

































































A):   = −0.086
Trade ( 
T):   = −0.121
Data ( 
GDP):   = −0.139
se = 0.044
Notes: This gure plots the relationship between country size and aggregate volatility implied by the data
(conditioning for per-capita GDP), the model with symmetric countries under trade, and the model with
symmetric countries in autarky. The dots represent actual observations of volatility. Note that the data
points and regression line are shifted by a constant for ease of visual comparability with the model regressions
lines. Source: The World Bank (2007b).






























































Notes: This gure reports the scatterplot of domestic output (ii) and bilateral trade (ij), both as a share
of domestic absorption. The values implied by the model are on the horizontal axis. Actual values are on the
vertical axis. Solid dots represent observations of ii, while hollow dots represent bilateral trade observations
(ij). The line through the data is the 45-degree line.
43Figure 6. Trade Openness: Data and Model Predictions






































































Notes: This gure reports total imports as a share of domestic absorption (1   ii). The values implied by
the model are on the horizontal axis. Actual values are on the vertical axis. The line through the data is
the 45-degree line.














































A):   = −0.097 Trade ( 
T):   = −0.137
Data ( 
GDP):   = −0.139
se = 0.044
Notes: This gure plots the relationship between country size and aggregate volatility implied by the data
(conditioning for per-capita GDP), the model with non-symmetric countries under trade, and the model
with non-symmetric countries in autarky. The dots represent actual observations of volatility. Note that
the data points and regression line are shifted by a constant for ease of visual comparability with the model
regressions lines. Source: The World Bank (2007b).
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